Lest anyone think that Campbell Brown went on a murderous rampage against all other PEA Brains to take over the blog for himself, I feel I should jump in and post something to let people know the rest of us are alive and to pick up some of our summer slack (and perhaps to give the Kiwi a rest).
So I’m going to steal shamelessly from the David Sobel playbook (he did something similar on consequentialism recently) and ask people to offer their favorite objections to contractualism. You can either then immediately offer a way to reply, or you can leave that to others.
I’ll start. Contractualism can’t be the fundamental criterion of rightness, insofar as the reasons trotted out in support of the reasonable agreement that allegedly gives rise to contractualist principles will actually depend on more fundamental moral principles. That is, it can’t be that what makes it wrong to kill babies is that doing so would not be in accord with principles that no reasonable person could reject; instead, there’d be general agreement on such principles precisely because it’s wrong to kill babies.