ETHICS ALERT

Procurable from the author:

 
Pamela Hieronymi, The
Will as Reason
(pdf, updated 8/4/06) I here defend an account of the will
as practical reason—or, using Kant’s phrase, as “reason in its practical
employment”—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition
to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain
commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal
the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in
action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the other direction: the
activities of the will are activities for which the person is answerable in a
very particular sort of way. This answerability is most easily understood if
willing involves settling a question. Settling a question seems to be a
capacity of reason. Thus it can seem that activities of will are activities of
our capacity for reasoning. I will suggest that we can accommodate the
commonplaces while still understanding the will as reason in its practical
employment, by abandoning the assumption that practical reasoning concludes in a
judgment. Rather, reasoning which concludes in a judgment—reasoning directed at
the question of whether pis theoretical reasoning. In its practical
employment, reason is directed at the question of whether to x; it
concludes, not in a judgment about x-ing, but rather in an intention to x.


Procurable from the publisher:


Notre Dame Philosophical
Reviews

2006-08-07 : View this Review Online

Carlos J. Moya, Moral Responsibility: the Ways of Scepticism,
Routledge, 2006, 233pp., $113.00 (hbk), ISBN 0415371953.

Reviewed by Matthew Talbert, University
of California, San Diego

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Multiple-Act Consequentialism

Joseph Mendola
Noûs;
Volume 40, Issue 3, 2006Sep1, Page 395

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00618.x?ai=2l6&ui=gfy1&af=T

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Richard
J. Arneson
, Luck
Egalitarianism: An Interpretation and Defense
, forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.

 

Not like
this:

 

<a href=
“http://philosophy2.ucsd.edu/~rarneson/index.html”>Richard J.
Arneson</a>, <a
href=“http://philosophy2.ucsd.edu/~rarneson/luckegalitarianism2.pdf”>Luck
Egalitarianism: An Interpretation and Defense</a>. forthcoming in
<i>Philosophical Topics</i>.