(Also posted on Flickers of Freedom.)
I am a fan of attributability as a conception of responsibility. The trick, as we all know, is to get clear on just what that means. Even if you don't think attributability is a conception of responsibility, it is surely necessary for responsibility, so getting clear on what it consists in is in everyone's interest. One popular theory of attributability is a kind of evaluative judgment view: an action or attitude is properly attributable to me just in case it is ultimately dependent on my evaluative judgments. I'm wondering, though, about the following possible counterexample to this view.
Consider a kind of Freudian case. Suppose for years I've been spurning lovers after only a short time together, based on what I think are evaluative judgments of their minor faults. But after going into therapy, I come to the realization that I had been spurning them out of a deep fear of rejection, given that my beloved father abandoned our family when I was still young. These (spurning) actions seem genuinely attributable to me, but not in virtue of their being dependent on the "evaluative judgments" I was making at the time or the product of any real evaluative stance, then. How would the evaluative judgments view deal with such a case? Perhaps the actions just aren't therefore attributable to me for purposes of responsibility/aretaic predication? Or perhaps I was expressing an attitude that was judgment sensitive were I ideally rational? I'd love to hear any thoughts you all might have about this (and I'm grateful to David Sobel for mentioning a case like this in some earlier correspondence).