Rationality in Law and Legal Theory: An Ethics Symposium

April 12–13, 2013, Georgetown University Law Center.  Details below the fold.


Both the law and legal theory make use of the notion of rationality. Within legal
theory both positivists and natural law theorists have put forward theses about
rationality in order to support their accounts of the nature of legality. And the
law itself is rife with appeals to rationality—for example, in tort law, to specify the
general duty of care, violation of which constitutes negligence, and in criminal
law, to fill out various standard excuses (duress, mistake, provocation, etc.). The
aim of this symposium is to bring together philosophers and legal theorists to
examine these notions of rationality within their own disciplines and to consider
the relationship between rationality as it is conceived within the law and as it has
been conceived in legal theory. Speakers include Marcia Baron (St. Andrews),
Heidi Li Feldman (Georgetown), Claire Finkelstein (Penn), John Gardner (Oxford),
Scott Hershovitz (Michigan), and Lewis Kornhauser (NYU). Registration
is free, but required. For more information or to register, visit here

Sponsored by this journal in cooperation with the Department of Philosophy at Georgetown
University and the Georgetown University Law Center.