There is surprisingly little discussion about pain’s badness in the philosophical literature. One might think that it falls naturally out of any of the various theories of well-being, but this is not so straightforward (as Shelly Kagan argues). In recent work, I look at some ways pain’s badness can be explained. This post summarizes some of my arguments.
At first, the explanation for pain’s badness seems simple: it hurts! Ideally, an account of pain’s badness will appeal to pain’s feel in the explanation. It would be nice if that were all there were to it – pain is bad straightforwardly in virtue of the negative feeling tone. Call such a view dolorism. Straightforward dolorism is, however, too straightforward. It fails to allow for cases where pain is not intuitively bad. I will discuss one type of case. (Another, which I explain elsewhere, is a condition called pain asymbolia, in which patients report to experience pain but don’t find it bothersome.)
There are some instances where pain is enjoyed directly, just for the way it feels, such as the pain of exertion in intense exercise. Some people enjoy this feeling not as a sign of the good work they are doing, but intrinsically, i.e., for the sake of the feeling itself. I call these kinds of experiences “hurts so good” (HSG) experiences. They are surprisingly commonplace. Many people enjoy the painful zing of very spicy food, the pain of a deep tissue massage, jumping in a freezing cold lake, or sitting in a very hot sauna. There are also psychological HSG experiences, such as the fear induced in watching a horror movie or riding a roller coaster, or feelings of deep sorrow from listening to very stirring music or watching a tragic play. All of these experiences have negative feeling tone, and so according to dolorism, they would be intrinsically bad for us. But this seems inaccurate. It does not seem irrational to pursue these feelings simple for the way they feel. But if they were intrinsically bad for us, then it would be. Dolorism cannot explain this.
One may think to say that dolorism can very easily account for these experiences. It’s simply a matter of the right hedono-doloric balance – the pain of these experiences is worth some small number, X, dolors, but also some larger Y number of hedons, and on balance is positive. A dolorist will insist that this is true. But things are not this simple. The hedono-doloric calculus requires that the pleasure outweigh the pain. But this simply does not seem to be necessary in some cases. Suppose S is currently enjoying a very intense deep tissue massage. Suppose the masseuse increases the pressure even more intensely. It is now very painful! S’s enjoyment stays the same. S enjoys the increased pain just as much and no more as the less intense pain. I take it the natural intuition is that her level of well-being stays the same. But the dolorist cannot say this. They are committed to saying that either it decreases when the pain increases. This is counterintuitive.
Moreover, consider the reasons that S has to get the massage. S enjoys painful massages, so she has reason to get one. But according to dolorism, the pain gives her some reason not to get one, because it is bad for her. But the painful experience is the very thing that gives her the reason to get one – this is just what she wants. Dolorism is too straightforward to capture this.
Cases such as these lead others to endorse a conditionalist account of pain’s badness: an experience is bad for S iff S desires not to experience it. Most of the time we don’t want to feel pain.
While conditionalism captures the intuitions about HSG experiences, it fails, however, to capture the most basic intuition about pain, namely, the theoretical intuition that pain’s badness is explained by how it feels. The quality of pain’s feel is irrelevant for the conditionalist explanation of its badness. But the way pain feels seems centrally relevant for why it is bad. It justifies our dislike of it. The conditionalist account has the direction of explanation going the wrong way.
Yet attitudes do seem relevant to the value of pain experiences. After all, the painful massage seems to be good for S at least in part because she wants it, just for the way it feels. Consequently the best approach would be a hybrid view that captures that pain’s feel is relevant for its badness and that attitudes can shape its value.
I propose such a view. Dolorism is correct insofar as pain is bad in virtue of the way it feels. But the badness of pain can be defeated by the presence of a pro-attitude. In a nutshell:
S’s experience E is bad for S (at t) if E has negative feeling tone, unless S has a relevant pro-attitude intrinsically toward E at t.
I call this reverse conditionalism. This view retains the dolorist thesis that pain is bad in virtue of feeling tone, and adds a defeating “unless” clause. Thus reverse conditionalism captures the relevance of pain’s badness in the explanation – indeed, pain’s feel is all there is to the explanation of its badness – and yet also explain why HSG experiences and other such cases are not bad (and may even be good).
This view follows a pattern of the defeat of value that can be seen in other cases. Desert is a classic example. Says Chisholm, “[i]f A is a wicked deed and if B is the suffering involved in the sinner’s remorse or in his retribution, then the two evils, A and B, may be preferable to A without B”. The two bads in this case are defeated by being part of a larger whole in which the presence of the other part defeats the badness of the overall whole. This is not to say that the sinner’s pain is not bad for the sinner; rather, the point is to illustrate that there are plausible cases in which this pattern of value appears, namely, where the badness of one thing is defeated, either entirely or partially, as a result of a relation to something else.
This, then, is what I propose for pain and the defeat of its badness: the badness of pain can be defeated by an attitude of the welfare subject toward his pain intrinsically.
The next question to ask is about the relative badness of pains – i.e., how bad any two pains might be in relation to one another. Plausibly, pain’s badness (absent any pro-attitude) is a function of its intensity and duration, i.e., a very intense pain is worse than a less intense pain for the same duration. Pro-attitudes too vary in intensity.
But could even a very weak pro-attitude defeat the badness of horrible, unrelenting, agonizing pain? Could even the slightest welcoming of some slight feature of the sensation neutralize the badness of unrelenting agony? This seems implausible.
But just as in other cases of the defeat of value, reverse conditionalism can allow that the badness of the pain may be defeated only partially, depending on the badness of the pain absent the pro-attitude, and the intensity of the pro-attitude itself. If a very intense pain is met with an only weak pro-attitude, the badness of the pain is defeated only partially – it may still be bad for the subject, albeit (perhaps just slightly) less bad than it would be absent the pro-attitude. (This is not to be confused with the (likely true) claim that the experience of a pain may change depending on the attitude – a pain that one looks forward to is likely to hurt less than a pain that one is not expecting at all or even dreading. This is a matter of the feel of the pain experience itself, whereas its value is a function of this experience and the attitude toward it.)
There is much more to be said, and what I have written here is a short version of a full paper. I look forward to hearing what you think.
 Brentano and Intrinsic Value (CUP, 1986), p. 72. See also R. M. Chisholm, “The Defeat of Good and Evil,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 42 (1968-1969), pp. 21-38.
 See Shelly Kagan, “An Introduction to Ill-Being,” in Mark Timmons, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 4 (OUP, 2014).
Gwen Bradford is an associate professor of Philosophy at Rice University with a research focus in value theory and normative ethics.2