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2016 Colorado Summer Seminar in Philosophy

The philosophy department at the University of Colorado Boulder is now accepting applications for the 2016 Colorado Summer Seminar in Philosophy, which will run from July 18th through August 4th in Boulder.  The end of the Seminar coincides with the start of the 2016 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME).  The Seminar is intended for outstanding undergraduates who are considering graduate school in philosophy.  The topic for this year’s seminar is “Paradoxes and Puzzles.”  Review of applications will begin on April 1 and continue until all available positions are filled.  More information here:

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/outreach_summer_seminar.shtml

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CFP: Seventh Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress

RoME 
Seventh Annual
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ETHICS CONGRESS
University of Colorado, Boulder
August 7-10, 2014
Boulder, Colorado 

an international conference geared to offer the highest quality, highest altitude discussion of ethics, broadly conceived 

Call For Papers

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Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress: Call For Commentators

If you're interested in being a commentator at our upcoming Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress this August in Boulder, Colorado (or if you'd just like to see a preliminary main conference program), please continue reading …

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CFP: Third Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics (RoME) Congress (Feb. 15 deadline)

University of Colorado, Boulder 
August 5-8, 2010 
Boulder, Colorado

an international conference geared to offer the highest quality, highest altitude discussion of ethics, broadly conceived

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CFP: First Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics (RoME) Congress

While we’re on the topic of CFP’s for August 2008, let me announce the fact that we are starting a new summer ethics conference here at the University of Colorado at Boulder.  (I say ‘we’, but I can take no credit for it — all the work has been done by Alastair Norcross and Ben Hale.)  Ben Bradley is such a hero that I bet if he breaks another bone at the BSPC 2008, he’ll still be the first to arrive at the Boulder conference, which starts the next day.  See below for details. 

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A Dilemma for Subjectivism

Let’s say a theory in normative ethics is subjectivist just in case, according to it, what one ought to do is determined ultimately by the attitudes of some subject or group of subjects, such as the agent himself, the agent’s society, some ideal observer, or God.  So ordinary subjectivism, cultural relativism, ideal observer theory, and divine command theory are all forms of subjectivism.  Here’s a dilemma for such views.

(Sorry, this post is on the longer side.  But it is (I hope) easy reading – no fine points, nothing technical.)

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An Argument Against the Rational Care Theory of Welfare

Stephen Darwall has advanced the rational care theory of welfare, a metaethical thesis about the meaning of welfare judgments.  Somewhat informally, here’s the view:

RCTW: to say that some state of affairs x would be good for someone is to say that anyone who cares for that person should desire that x occur for his sake; to say that some state of affairs x would be bad for someone is to say that anyone who cares for that person should desire that x not occur for his sake.

On this view, it’s not that you should desire what’s good for those you care about because it’s  good for them; rather, it’s good for them in virtue of the fact that you should desire it.  The ‘should’ here is the ‘should’ of rationality, as in “appropriateness.”  To say you should desire the thing is to say that it is appropriate for you to do so, that the thing merits, or calls for, your desiring it.

Here’s an argument against RCTW, based on Parfit’s case My Past or Future Operations.

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