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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics Comments (10)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Paulina Sliwa‘s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Kieran Setiya has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Announcements, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup Comments Off on Upcoming Ethics Discussion, April 25-27: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, April 25-27: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

We are excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will focus on Paulina Sliwa‘s paper, “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong”. The paper is available through open access here. A critical précis will be provided by Kieran Setiya. Join us April 25-27!

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Moral Psychology, Normative Ethics, Practical Rationality Comments (41)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Abe Roth‘s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Sarah Stroud has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Moral Psychology, Normative Ethics Comments Off on Upcoming Ethics Discussion, October 27-29: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, October 27-29: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud

We are excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will focus on Abe Roth‘s paper, “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation”. The paper is available through open access here. A critical précis will be provided by Sarah Stroud. Join us October 27-29!

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By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup Comments (31)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Dale Dorsey’s “Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry,” with a critical précis by Kathryn M Lindeman

Et.2016.126.issue-3.cover Welcome to what will hopefully be a very interesting discussion of Dale Dorsey's "Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry". The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and available to read through open access here. Kathryn M Lindeman has kindly contributed a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

(more…)

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By In Discussions Comments Off on Upcoming Ethics Discussion, Apr 18-20: Dale Dorsey’s “Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry,” with a critical précis by Kathryn M Lindeman

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, Apr 18-20: Dale Dorsey’s “Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry,” with a critical précis by Kathryn M Lindeman

We’re excited to announce our next Ethics discussion on Dale Dorsey‘s “Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry.” The paper is available through open access here. Kathryn M Lindeman has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us on April 18-20!

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By In Normative Ethics, Value Theory Comments (15)

The Virtue Responsive Evil Demon

Suppose you are an ordinary virtuous agent. Up until now, you haven’t lived the kind of life that involves making any huge life or death decisions, but you are kind to your friends and acquaintances, charitable to distant strangers in need, honest to everyone except those you can’t trust etc. Now an evil demon comes to you and tells you that, for the rest of your life, he will kill 5 people (randomly selected strangers in another country) every time you act virtuously, and won’t kill any people every time you act non-virtuously. He makes it impossible for you to commit suicide (if this were an option, you might think you should immediately take it – although doing so would, quite plausibly, lead to the death of 5 people, the killing would stop there). (Alternatively, one could simply specify that the demon tells you that whenever you happen to die, but not before, he will move on to present some other ordinary virtuous person with the same problem.) On the assumption that the evil demon will keep his word, what are you to do? Given that you start off virtuous, what might we predict you do in this situation? And what might we predict the demon does in response to your subsequent acts?

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