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By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Value Theory Comments (17)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Louise Hanson’s “Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim,” with a critical précis by Alex King

 

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Louise Hanson‘s “Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics, and is available here. Alex King has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Applied Ethics, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy Comments (26)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” with a critical précis by Erin Kelly

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva‘s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Erin Kelly has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Erin Kelly writes:

Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s paper, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” argues that capital punishment wrongs black defendants and black communities, and that the proper remedy for this wrong is abolition of the death penalty. In developing this argument, they make an interesting case for understanding the racial wrongs of capital punishment in political terms—as instances of distributive injustice—rather than (simply) in terms of a failure to achieve retributive justice. I will explore both the nature of their claims about distributive justice and their criticism of retributive justice. I won’t address the case for abolition, which flows naturally from their conclusions about the harm done by the death penalty. Instead I will suggest, briefly, how their argument against the retributive theory could be stronger.

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy Comments (31)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Valentine

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Beth Valentine has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Précis by Beth Valentine

“Hypothetical consent is puzzling.” (p.1)  This is how Enoch begins his paper, but by the end I was convinced that this claim is false. “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy” motivates this initial puzzlement by pointing to intuitions regarding hypothetical consent that, at first, appear to lack a cohesive explanation. Through examining actual consent and autonomy, he does much to explain away this puzzlement and argues that hypothetical consent can, in some contexts, make a normative difference.

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By In Uncategorized Comments Off on Upcoming Ethics Discussion, October 22-24: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Vallentine

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, October 22-24: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Vallentine

We’re excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will be about David Enoch‘s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.” The paper is available through open access hereBeth Valentine has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us October 22-24!

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics Comments (10)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Paulina Sliwa‘s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Kieran Setiya has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Announcements, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup Comments Off on Upcoming Ethics Discussion, April 25-27: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, April 25-27: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

We are excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will focus on Paulina Sliwa‘s paper, “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong”. The paper is available through open access here. A critical précis will be provided by Kieran Setiya. Join us April 25-27!

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Moral Psychology, Normative Ethics, Practical Rationality Comments (41)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Abe Roth‘s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Sarah Stroud has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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