Welcome to our discussion thread on David Sobel’s From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism, recently reviewed by Ben Bramble for NDPR. We have invited Sobel and Bramble to provide any comments they’d like on either the book or the review, and we hope other readers of PEA Soup will chime in with thoughts on either the book or the review as well.
Welcome to our discussion thread on Owen Flanagan’s The Geography of Morals, recently reviewed by Regina Rini for NDPR. We have invited Owen and Regina to provide any comments they’d like on either the book or the review, and we hope other readers of PEA Soup will chime in with thoughts on either the book or the review as well.
Welcome to the next installation of our ongoing forum for discussion of recent books in moral/political philosophy, alongside the reviews of them in NDPR, which provides authors a chance to respond to their reviewers (and for the reviewers to respond back). Today we open discussion on Jason Brennan’s book Against Democracy, which was recently reviewed by Tom Christiano (Arizona) in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (NDPR). Blurbs from both the book and the review below the fold. Please join in on the discussion. Feel free to post thoughts on the book, the review, or Jason’s response to the review, which will appear below.
Just a quick announcement to let you all know of some exciting upcoming discussions on the Soup about recently published books and book reviews. Next Thursday (June 8), we will host a discussion of Owen Flanagan’s Geography of Morals, in light of Regina Rini’s recent NDPR review of it. And in upcoming days and weeks we will host discussions of Jason Brennan’s Against Democracy (reviewed by Tom Christiano), Christine Tappolet’s Emotions, Values, and Agency (reviewed by Benjamin De Mesel), and Julie Rose’s Free Time (reviewed by Eric Rakowski). We hope you all will join in on these discussions.
Much is made these days of ideological bubbles and commitment cocoons (OK, I made up that one), in which people stick to their beliefs regardless of any “evidence” or “reasoning” otherwise. But, let’s admit it, it’s hard to change your mind about something you’ve been committed to solely based on your assessment of reasons. This is true even for — perhaps especially for — professional philosophers.
It might be worth hearing, then, about your true conversion stories and the role contrary reasons played for you: What moral/political view were you committed to — perhaps even published about — that you abandoned solely in the face of good reasons otherwise? Were the reasons available to you all along and you just saw them in a newly salient light, or were they new reasons to you? Have you “backslid”? Have you gone on to publish on the contrary view? (See my conversion story below the fold.)
The program for the 4th biennial New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR 4) has been set. It is pasted below the fold. The workshop takes place in New Orleans on November 2-4, 2017, and this year it kicks off with an open discussion on the foundations of moral responsibility, with Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, Chandra Sripada, and David Shoemaker. The three keynote speakers this year are Jeanette Kennett, Michael S. Moore, and Angela Smith. Registration is free, and just requires an email to David Shoemaker (dshoemak AT tulane DOT edu). Information about lodging (with a reserved hotel block) to be found soon on the Murphy Institute website.
Call for Participation
Climate Ethics And Climate Economics: Risk, Uncertainty and Catastrophe Scenarios
Workshop at the University of Cambridge
Convened by Simon Beard (with Kai Spiekermann), supported by the ESRC, in partnership with the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
8-10 May 2017
Accompanied by public lectures given by Professor Doyne Farmer and Professor Hilary Greaves on the evenings of the 8th and 10th of May.
The fifth of six ESRC-funded workshops on Climate Ethics and Climate Economics.
We are now looking for participants.
Matthew Rendall (University of Nottingham)
John Halstead (University of Oxford)
Elizabeth Baldwin (University of Oxford)
Doyne Farmer (Oxford Martin School)
Tina Sikka (University of Newcastle)
Iñaki San Pedro (University of the Basque Country)
Eike Düvel (University of Graz)
Hilary Greaves (Future of Humanity Institute)
Mariam Thalos (University of Utah)
Kieran Marray (University of Oxford)
Some scholars, most notably Martin Weitzman (2009; 2011) have warned that there is an uncertain chance of runaway climate change that could devastate the planet. At least since Hans Jonas’s The Imperative of Responsibility (1981), some have argued that even low-probability existential risks should be treated in a fundamentally different way. How should we act when we believe that there is some chance of a catastrophe, but cannot make reliable probability estimates (Elster 1979; Haller 2002; Gardiner 2005)? How much should we worry about worst-case scenarios? What should we do when experts disagree about whether catastrophe is possible?
Papers will be pre-circulated, with short presentations and comments from discussants.
Please pre-register here.