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By In Uncategorized Comments Off on Normativity Conference at Southampton

Normativity Conference at Southampton

Philosophy at Southampton will host a major international conference, as part of the AHRC-funded ‘Normativity: Epistemic and Practical’ project, from Tuesday the 8th to Thursday the 10th of September 2015. This closing conference aims to bring together the three main themes of the project: substantive connections between epistemic and practical norms, explanatory connections between epistemic and practical norms, and meta-normative problems and proposals. More details, including a call for abstracts, are below the fold.

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By In News and Events Comments Off on British Society for Ethical Theory Conference

British Society for Ethical Theory Conference

This year's British Society for Ethical Theory Conference will be held at the University of Southampton on 13th and 14th July. The list of papers is below the fold. For further details, including registration, see: http://www.bset.org.uk/2015.html

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By In News and Events Comments Off on Announcement: Two Workshops at Southampton in April

Announcement: Two Workshops at Southampton in April

The University of Southampton will host two one-day workshops in April that might be of interest to Pea Soup readers. The first, on April 13th, is on Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics and Epistemology. The second, on April 18th, is on Ethics and Emotion in the Post-Kantian tradition. Further details below the fold.

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By In News and Events Comments Off on Two Workshops at Southampton

Two Workshops at Southampton

Southampton will be hosting two workshops in June. On Friday 13th June, there will be a workshop on Epistemic and Practical Normativity. On Wednesday 18th June, there will be a workshop on Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics and Epistemology. See below the fold for more details.

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By In Metaethics Comments (13)

A Worry About Reasons Primitivism

A recently influential idea in the
philosophy of normativity is reasons primitivism. Reasons primitivists
hold that we can give no account of what it is for some consideration to be a
(normative) reason. At most we can say that reasons are considerations that count
in favour (or against) some response, or that when there is reason to do
something, there is something to be said
for doing that thing. In this post (which is intended in the spirit of Dave and
Dave’s request for half-baked ideas…) I want to raise a worry about this view.

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