By In Call For Papers Comments Off on Final Call for Abstracts: 2016 Effective Altruism Global Research Meeting

Final Call for Abstracts: 2016 Effective Altruism Global Research Meeting

Location: August 5th to 7th, University of California, Berkeley

Abstract Deadline: July 10th


The 2016 Effective Altruism Global Research Meeting is an opportunity for Postgraduate students and early stage academics from a variety of disciplines to present research relevant to Effective Altruism. The meeting will take place on August 5th to 7th, 2016 at UC Berkeley alongside the Effective Altruism Global conference. The meeting will consist of two events, an academic poster session and a number of short oral presentations. Presentations will be awarded to the most exceptional submissions. Participants selected for presentations will still have the option to present a poster.


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By In News and Events Comments (1)

Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT), October 10-11, 2014

Second Annual Conference — Call For Papers, Submission Deadline: August 1, 2014
The second annual Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT) will take place on October 10-11, 2014 at the University of Texas at Austin. We are pleased to host Professor Ruth Chang (Rutgers) for this year's keynote address. 


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By In Moral Psychology Comments (26)

How Humeans Can Explain Reason-Choosing

One objection to Humean views about motivation, and to the 'Standard Model' of intention on which intentions are complexes of desire and belief, is that these views don't allow agents to choose their reasons for doing some action.  In Reasons Without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya presents the Standard Model as unable to explain how "Our reasons are in some sense 'up to us' — we decide why to do something, as well as what to do –  and we seem to recognize our reasons, as such" (39).  Similarly, in Rationality in Action John Searle objects to desire-belief views of motivation, writing that "when one has several reasons for performing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on" (65).

I can see where these objections are coming from.  On a traditional Humean picture, reason is the slave of the passions, and it doesn't have the ability to hold one desire back so that another can motivate action.  Neither can it noninstrumentally create or strengthen a desire so as to make it and not another desire decisive in motivating action.  Nevertheless, I think a traditional Humean approach on which all motivating reasons are desire-belief pairs and all practical reasoning is instrumental can explain reason-choosing.  Let me show how this works. 


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