Welcome to what we expect will be an interesting and productive discussion on Preston’s Werner‘s “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge” (which the Journal of Moral Philosophy has generously provided free access to until the end of November). David Faraci has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Critical Précis by David Faraci:
Thanks to PEA Soup and to the Journal of Moral Philosophy for offering me this opportunity to discuss Preston Werner’s excellent “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.”
Preston’s paper is, in large part, a response to my “A Hard Look at Moral Perception” (Philosophical Studies 2015), and I want to thank him for taking the time to trudge through that paper. I’ve written a longer reply to Preston, which is also forthcoming in JMP. What I’ll say here is a mix of things I say there and some new stuff.