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By In Metaethics Comments (50)

Incoherentism

File this under “meta-meta-ethics”

Don Loeb and Michael Gill currently defend a ‘variability thesis’, the view that ordinary moral thought and language contains both cognitivist and non-cognitivist elements.

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Value and Kantians

The standard view of Kantianism has been that it firmly denies that the right is grounded in the good.

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Chisholm II

Well, since the comments on my last post were so interesting and helpful, let’s see how things go with this, another apparent problem with Chisholm’s views. Chisholm (in 1978) defined intrinsic goodness in terms of a generic account of intrinsic value states (e.g., either intrinsic goodness or intrinsic badness):

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Chisholm on Intrinsic Value

Here’s a problem with Roderick Chisholm’s well-known account of intrinsic goodness I’d like solved, and I bet some of you will know how to solve it.

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