Practical reasons
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By In Announcements, News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2018 Program

SLACRR 2018 Program

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality

May 20-22, 2018

All talks are in the Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, MO.
Sunday, May 20
Keynote address: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)
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By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments (8)

An exchange between Chrisoula Andreau and Justin Snedegar’s on Snedegar’s book Contrastive Reasons.

With this post we are starting a new feature at PEA Soup: Author replies to book reviews published in Ethics. Our inaugural discussion is between Chrisoula Andreou (Utah) and Justin Snedegar (St. Andrews). Chrisoula reviews Justin’s new book, Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) here. Justin Snedegar’s reply follows below.

Thanks first of all to the Daves for the opportunity to continue the discussion here. And thanks most of all to Chrisoula for her excellent review of my book. Her questions and objections have given me the chance to think harder about some central issues that didn’t receive all the attention they deserved in the book. In particular, she’s made clear that there are important questions about the nature of the objectives the promotion of which I appeal to in my contrastive analyses of reasons. I used a desire to remain neutral between competing views of these objectives as an excuse for not discussing them much, but this neutrality was about relatively substantive questions about whether the objectives were desires, values, etc. Chrisoula’s objections show that there are questions about structural or formal features of objectives and of the promotion relation which are crucial for my theory, and indeed for many theories of reasons.

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By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Practical reasons Comments Off on New Soup Feature: Replies to Ethics book reviews

New Soup Feature: Replies to Ethics book reviews

In our never-ending quest to expand to the limits of the Universe and beyond, Soup will begin having replies to Ethics book reviews.

First up, in about a week, will be Chrisoula Andreou’s review of Justin Snedegar’s Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) which will be available open access here, together with Justin’s replies. Looking forward to the discussion!

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By In Announcements, Call For Papers, News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2018 and Res Philosophica Prize Issue: CFA

SLACRR 2018 and Res Philosophica Prize Issue: CFA

SLACRR 2018
Call for Abstracts

May 20-22, 2018, Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, MO

Keynote Speaker: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)

SLACRR provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an anonymized abstract of 750-1500 words by January 15, 2018 to SLACRR@gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation. Please attach your abstract as a pdf file, the name of which should be based upon the title of your abstract. (In other words, don’t name your file FILE.pdf or ABSTRACT.pdf)

Papers accepted this year will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Res Philosophica on the topic of reasons and rationality to be published in the first half of 2019. Furthermore, one essay published in the issue will receive a $3,000 prize for best paper. Authors of accepted papers may, but need not, submit their paper to this special issue. Submissions of full papers for the issue will be due August 31, 2018, and will be blind reviewed. Questions regarding the special issue of Res Philosophica can be directed to the editor, Joe Salerno, at editor@resphilosophica.org

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By In Ideas, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments (8)

Conversion Stories

Much is made these days of ideological bubbles and commitment cocoons (OK, I made up that one), in which people stick to their beliefs regardless of any “evidence” or “reasoning” otherwise. But, let’s admit it, it’s hard to change your mind about something you’ve been committed to solely based on your assessment of reasons. This is true even for — perhaps especially for — professional philosophers.

It might be worth hearing, then, about your true conversion stories and the role contrary reasons played for you: What moral/political view were you committed to — perhaps even published about — that you abandoned solely in the face of good reasons otherwise? Were the reasons available to you all along and you just saw them in a newly salient light, or were they new reasons to you? Have you “backslid”? Have you gone on to publish on the contrary view? (See my conversion story below the fold.)

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By In News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2017 Program

SLACRR 2017 Program

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality 2017

May 21-23, 2017

Keynote: Kieran Setiya (MIT)

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By In Action Theory (Philosophy of Action), Ideas, Metaethics, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality, Value Theory Comments (4)

Decisive Reasons and Rational Supererogation

I have a roughly formulated and half-baked inquiry:

Suppose that rationality endorses maximizing utility, but there is room for rational supererogation, and so it is sometimes rationally permissible to drink a coffee even if doing so does not maximize utility.

Would you say that there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, it is still rationally permissible?  Or would you say that, because drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, there is decisive reason against drinking the coffee even though drinking it is rationally permissible?

I am attracted to a usage of decisive reason according to which the consideration that C pinpoints a decisive reason against A’s X-ing if and only if, because C, A should not X.  Given this usage, there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee (from the point of view of rationality) because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, drinking the coffee is still rationally permissible and so it is not true that one should not drink the coffee.  I wonder if folks would balk at this implication and see usages with this implication as thereby counter-intuitive.

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