Moral Psychology Archives

On September 9, 2018 By David Shoemaker In Announcements, Virtue Comments Off on VIRTUE, an Ethics Consultancy Like

VIRTUE, an Ethics Consultancy

From Reid Blackman:

I recently founded VIRTUE, an ethics consultancy. VIRTUE helps businesses identify where they are at risk of ethical misconduct that threatens their brand and bottom line. Think, for instance, of #BoycottStarbucks, #MeToo, and #DeleteFacebook. We then work with those businesses to systematically mitigate that risk.

The issues VIRTUE addresses are wide-ranging and include, for instance, gender equity, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, biotechnology, diversity, human rights, privacy, the environment, governance, and inequality.

Philosophers who are interested in working with VIRTUE on a per-project basis can find information here. We are looking for philosophers of all ranks and signing up to be notified about potential projects that match one’s interests and expertise takes about 5 minutes. Any questions can be directed to reid@virtueconsultants.com.

On July 23, 2018 By David Shoemaker In NDPR Discussion Forum, Virtue Comments (3) 1

NDPR Forum: Inner Virtue

Welcome to our forum on Nicolas Bommarito’s Inner Virtue (OUP 2017), reviewed recently by Brad Cokelet on NDPR. Please join in the discussion!

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On June 24, 2018 By David Shoemaker In Experimental Philosophy, Moral Psychology Comments (3) Like

Personal Identity and Moral Psychology

Kevin Tobia and I have co-written a paper on personal identity for the Oxford Handbook on Moral Psychology, edited by John Doris and Manuel Vargas. You can see the draft here. What’s particularly new and interesting about the entry is Kevin’s part of the project, which involves a survey and critical discussion of the state of the art on work about personal identity that has taken place in the psychology-heavy literature over the last 5-10 years. We then bring together that literature with the standard philosophy-heavy work on the topic since Locke. As we will get one more run on revising, we are interested in any thoughts you might have about it, preferably spelled out in the comments here.

On May 18, 2018 By Nicole Hassoun In Happiness, Uncategorized Comments (3) 1

Avi Appel: Unrestricted Wellbeing Subjectivism is Compatible with Self-Sacrifice

A theory of wellbeing contributes to explaining whether this or that state of affairs is a benefit or harm to a particular subject. A natural starting point from which to build such a theory is the subject’s valenced attitudes: I benefit from occurrences I like, desire, value, take a subjective interest in, etc. and am harmed by occurrences I dislike, desire not to happen, disvalue, take a subjective interest against, etc. Call this theory “Unrestricted Wellbeing Subjectivism.” The theory is unrestricted, since no state-of-affair types are excluded; that is, any occurring state of affairs that the subject takes a valenced attitude towards will benefit or harm that subject. There are several reasons philosophers have adduced in favor of restricting wellbeing subjectivism – i.e. in favor of stipulating that some specified types of events are ineligible to affect a subject’s wellbeing. One such source of reasons, against which I will defend unrestricted wellbeing subjectivism, is the problem of self-sacrifice.

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On May 10, 2018 By Nicole Hassoun In Happiness, Ideas, Value Theory Comments (7) 2

Gwen Bradford: Pain’s Badness

There is surprisingly little discussion about pain’s badness in the philosophical literature. One might think that it falls naturally out of any of the various theories of well-being, but this is not so straightforward (as Shelly Kagan argues).[1] In recent work, I look at some ways pain’s badness can be explained. This post summarizes some of my arguments.

At first, the explanation for pain’s badness seems simple: it hurts! Ideally, an account of pain’s badness will appeal to pain’s feel in the explanation. It would be nice if that were all there were to it – pain is bad straightforwardly in virtue of the negative feeling tone. Call such a view dolorism. Straightforward dolorism is, however, too straightforward. It fails to allow for cases where pain is not intuitively bad. I will discuss one type of case. (Another, which I explain elsewhere, is a condition called pain asymbolia, in which patients report to experience pain but don’t find it bothersome.)

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On May 7, 2018 By Nicole Hassoun In Happiness, Ideas, Value Theory Comments (7) Like

Lorraine L. Besser: The Fundamental Value of the Interesting

Think of the most recent remarkable experience you’ve had. Perhaps it was reading an engrossing novel that opened your eyes to a new depth of poverty, stamina, and kindness. Perhaps it was attending a sporting event you thought would exemplify stereotypes on the basest level yet turned out to deliver an unexpected but welcome insight into empowerment and dedication. Perhaps it was a sappy movie that helped you to cry when you most needed it, and then to laugh it off, so that you emerge with a fresh emotional state. Perhaps it was simply the wrong turn you took when trying to get across town that led you to discover a playground full of Somali immigrants, dressed in beautiful colors, playing soccer.

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On April 26, 2018 By Nicole Hassoun In Happiness, Value Theory Comments (6) Like

David Sobel: Two Roles for the Attitudes in an Account of Well-Being

Steve Wall and I have been thinking together about what the best theory of well-being that claims that loving the (prudentially) good is itself (prudentially) good would look like. Such views have been lovingly explored by, among others, Parfit, Darwall, Kagan, and Feldman. On such a view, there are objective prudential values, for example, achievement or friendship, which either have prudential value independently from any attitudes or whose value is more easily unlocked by the relevant attitudes than options without this objective value. Typically such views maintain that being objectively good, and one in some way loving or enjoying that objective good, are each necessary conditions, and jointly sufficient, for a benefit. (NB: The view under discussion here is different from Hurka’s related version of “loving the good is itself good” as Hurka ties this thought to virtue and he is not talking about prudential value.)

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