Chap. 2 of J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism is widely interpreted as defending qualitative hedonism, as a view about the nature of personal well-being. » …Read more
Category: Value Theory
Most contemporary work in population ethics operates within the framework of welfarism – the assumption that individual welfare is the fundamental value. But this framework is a straitjacket, » …Read more
In this post, I shall argue for the conclusion that there is no such thing as moral vagueness. The argument rests on a certain assumption, » …Read more
Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Louise Hanson‘s “Moral Realism, » …Read more
We’re pleased to announce our next Ethics review forum on Matti Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP 2017), reviewed by Sarah Zoe Raskoff. » …Read more
Welcome to our NDPR review forum on Cheshire Calhoun’s Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and Meaningful Living (OUP 2018), reviewed by Valerie Tiberius. » …Read more
There is surprisingly little discussion about pain’s badness in the philosophical literature. One might think that it falls naturally out of any of the various theories of well-being, » …Read more