Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Jonathan Leader Maynard and Alex Worsnip‘s “Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Alice Baderin has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Jonathan Leader Maynard and Alex Worsnip’s “Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?” with a critical précis by Alice Baderin
Upcoming Ethics Discussion, July 25-27: Jonathan Leader Maynard and Alex Worsnip’s “Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?” with a critical précis by Alice Baderin
We’re excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will be about Jonathan Leader Maynard and Alex Worsnip‘s “Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?” The paper is available through open access here. Alice Baderin has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us July 25-27!
I just wanted to let you know of several upcoming NDPR Forums on the Soup. On Wednesday, July 18, we will host a discussion of Benjamin Kiesewetter’s book The Normativity of Rationality (OUP 2017) and its recent review in NDPR by Alex Worsnip. On July 23, we will host a discussion of Nicolas Bommarito’s book Inner Virtue (OUP 2017) and its NDPR review by Brad Cokelet. Finally, in early August, we will host a discussion of Joseph Millum’s book The Moral Foundations of Parenthood (OUP 2018) and its NDPR review by Liezl van Zyl. So make sure to keep up with the hot and tasty happenings on Summer Soup!
While I’m here, let me also welcome Sukaina Hirji and Daniel Wodak to the Soup as our new Review Liaisons. They will be taking up the reins in handling both the NDPR Review Forums and our recently-begun Ethics Review Forums. So welcome to them both!
Ethics Reviews at PEA Soup: Exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions
I am pleased that PEA Soup will feature an exchange on Hanno Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions. Regina Rini reviewed this book in the most recent issue of Ethics. You can find an open access version of that review here.
Now we hear from Sauer in reply. And of course, as always, all are welcome to join in the discussion, ask clarificatory questions, press concerns, etc. Looking forward to a fruitful and thoughtful exchange. Here now is Sauer:
Reason in Nature? A Response to Rini
I tend to be relaxed about it when people engage with my work. Still, book reviews make me nervous. That one paper you wrote may be flawed – even embarassing, a dead end. But a whole book? It would be deeply unpleasant to find out if people thought that years of your toil had been worthless. When I heard that a review of my Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitionswas about to appear in Ethics, I got even more nervous. And the news that Regina Rini was its author really made me worry. (more…)
Ethics Reviews at PEA Soup: Upcoming exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions
Welcome to a newish series at Soup in which authors whose books were recently reviewed at Ethics continue the discussion with their reviewer. On July 9th we will have an exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions (MIT Press, 2017). All are welcome to participate in this exchange.
Today we provide a public access link to Rini’s review in Ethics to help people be in a better position to engage in the discussion.
Rini’s review can be found here.
Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” with a critical précis by Erin Kelly
Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva‘s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Erin Kelly has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Erin Kelly writes:
Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s paper, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” argues that capital punishment wrongs black defendants and black communities, and that the proper remedy for this wrong is abolition of the death penalty. In developing this argument, they make an interesting case for understanding the racial wrongs of capital punishment in political terms—as instances of distributive injustice—rather than (simply) in terms of a failure to achieve retributive justice. I will explore both the nature of their claims about distributive justice and their criticism of retributive justice. I won’t address the case for abolition, which flows naturally from their conclusions about the harm done by the death penalty. Instead I will suggest, briefly, how their argument against the retributive theory could be stronger.
With this post we are starting a new feature at PEA Soup: Author replies to book reviews published in Ethics. Our inaugural discussion is between Chrisoula Andreou (Utah) and Justin Snedegar (St. Andrews). Chrisoula reviews Justin’s new book, Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) here. Justin Snedegar’s reply follows below.
Thanks first of all to the Daves for the opportunity to continue the discussion here. And thanks most of all to Chrisoula for her excellent review of my book. Her questions and objections have given me the chance to think harder about some central issues that didn’t receive all the attention they deserved in the book. In particular, she’s made clear that there are important questions about the nature of the objectives the promotion of which I appeal to in my contrastive analyses of reasons. I used a desire to remain neutral between competing views of these objectives as an excuse for not discussing them much, but this neutrality was about relatively substantive questions about whether the objectives were desires, values, etc. Chrisoula’s objections show that there are questions about structural or formal features of objectives and of the promotion relation which are crucial for my theory, and indeed for many theories of reasons.