Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup
Category

By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup Comments Off on Ethics Reviews at PEA Soup: Upcoming exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions

Ethics Reviews at PEA Soup: Upcoming exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions

Welcome to a newish series at Soup in which authors whose books were recently reviewed at Ethics continue the discussion with their reviewer. On July 9th we will have an exchange between Hanno Sauer and Regina Rini on Sauer’s book Moral Judgements as Educated Intuitions (MIT Press, 2017). All are welcome to participate in this exchange.

Today we provide a public access link to Rini’s review in Ethics to help people be in a better position to engage in the discussion.

Rini’s review can be found here.

Read more

By In Applied Ethics, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy Comments (26)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” with a critical précis by Erin Kelly

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva‘s, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Erin Kelly has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Erin Kelly writes:

Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva’s paper, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” argues that capital punishment wrongs black defendants and black communities, and that the proper remedy for this wrong is abolition of the death penalty. In developing this argument, they make an interesting case for understanding the racial wrongs of capital punishment in political terms—as instances of distributive injustice—rather than (simply) in terms of a failure to achieve retributive justice. I will explore both the nature of their claims about distributive justice and their criticism of retributive justice. I won’t address the case for abolition, which flows naturally from their conclusions about the harm done by the death penalty. Instead I will suggest, briefly, how their argument against the retributive theory could be stronger.

(more…)

Read more

By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments (8)

An exchange between Chrisoula Andreau and Justin Snedegar’s on Snedegar’s book Contrastive Reasons.

With this post we are starting a new feature at PEA Soup: Author replies to book reviews published in Ethics. Our inaugural discussion is between Chrisoula Andreou (Utah) and Justin Snedegar (St. Andrews). Chrisoula reviews Justin’s new book, Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) here. Justin Snedegar’s reply follows below.

Thanks first of all to the Daves for the opportunity to continue the discussion here. And thanks most of all to Chrisoula for her excellent review of my book. Her questions and objections have given me the chance to think harder about some central issues that didn’t receive all the attention they deserved in the book. In particular, she’s made clear that there are important questions about the nature of the objectives the promotion of which I appeal to in my contrastive analyses of reasons. I used a desire to remain neutral between competing views of these objectives as an excuse for not discussing them much, but this neutrality was about relatively substantive questions about whether the objectives were desires, values, etc. Chrisoula’s objections show that there are questions about structural or formal features of objectives and of the promotion relation which are crucial for my theory, and indeed for many theories of reasons.

(more…)

Read more

By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Practical reasons Comments Off on New Soup Feature: Replies to Ethics book reviews

New Soup Feature: Replies to Ethics book reviews

In our never-ending quest to expand to the limits of the Universe and beyond, Soup will begin having replies to Ethics book reviews.

First up, in about a week, will be Chrisoula Andreou’s review of Justin Snedegar’s Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) which will be available open access here, together with Justin’s replies. Looking forward to the discussion!

Read more

By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup Comments (2)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Nandi Theunissen’s “Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity,” with a critical précis by Richard Kraut

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Nandi Theunissen‘s “Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access hereRichard Kraut kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

(more…)

Read more

By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy Comments (31)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Valentine

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Beth Valentine has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Précis by Beth Valentine

“Hypothetical consent is puzzling.” (p.1)  This is how Enoch begins his paper, but by the end I was convinced that this claim is false. “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy” motivates this initial puzzlement by pointing to intuitions regarding hypothetical consent that, at first, appear to lack a cohesive explanation. Through examining actual consent and autonomy, he does much to explain away this puzzlement and argues that hypothetical consent can, in some contexts, make a normative difference.

(more…)

Read more

By In Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Normative Ethics Comments (8)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Robert Cowan’s “Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism,” with a critical précis by Philip Stratton-Lake

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Robert Cowan‘s “Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism.” The article was published in the most recent issue of Ethics and is available through open access here. Philip Stratton-Lake has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Chike Jeffers

(more…)

Read more