Welcome to our NDPR Forum on Kit Wellman’s “Rights Forfeiture and Punishment,” which was recently reviewed by David Dolinko in NDPR. Kit has agreed to kick off this forum by contributing a new post on one of the issues raised in his book, namely, on whether there is or should be, on the rights forfeiture view, additional culpability for hate crimes. Please join in on the discussion. I herewith give you Kit:
What are the wrong-making features in this case? These are what seem to be the relevant details:
“According to British news reports, Mr. Bramhall, 53, admitted to using an argon beam — an electrified gas jet that liver surgeons typically employ to stanch bleeding or to mark an area of operation on an organ — to etch “SB,” his initials, onto the livers. Argon beam marks are usually not harmful and would normally disappear. But they were apparently discovered by a colleague when one of the patients underwent a follow-up operation.”
Suppose instead he had sewn a suture in a distinctive way, his “signature style.” Would that too have been “assault”?
As Thanksgiving rolls around, it’s time to pause and take stock of how you got to be who you are, at least as a moral/political philosopher, and what giant’s shoulders you’ve been standing on to see as far as you’ve seen. What’s the ONE moral/political philosophy book or article you’re most thankful for and how did it influence you?
Hi everyone! Thanks very much for the opportunity to discuss our work-in-progress, “‘I Love Women’: The Conceptual Inadequacy of ‘Implicit Bias.’”
Tests for implicit bias, in particular the Implicit Association Test (IAT), have recently come under scrutiny. Two different meta-analyses, by Oswald et al. (2013) and Forscher et al. (2016) (recently discussed in the Chronicle of Higher Education) have concluded that measurements of “implicit bias” do not reliably predict biased behavior.
In our paper, we offer a different critique of implicit bias testing, one which philosophers and other humanistic thinkers might be well-suited to address. We argue that the dominant implicit bias tests assume crude and implausible conceptions of explicit prejudice, leaving open the possibility that the morally bad and wrong actions supposedly best explained by something interestingly implicit are instead best explained by non-obvious but nonetheless explicit prejudice.[i]
Re-posting after a technical glitch this morning (eds.)
Current events are reminding us that patriotism, at least of the sort that gets publicly acknowledged, is a confusing virtue. I don’t mean that the patriot might get drawn into doing bad things on behalf of his country. Patriotism is a form of loyalty, and loyalty, whether to friends, family, one’s university, or whatever, can draw us into doing bad things on their behalf. I mean instead that those who say they care about patriotism seem surprisingly okay with others doing bad things without regard for the interests of their country.
Over the past few years, an interesting development in experimental philosophy has been work on the “ought implies can” principle (OIC) in commonsense morality. Several research teams have investigated whether patterns in commonsense moral judgment are consistent with a commitment to OIC, understood as a conceptual entailment from having a moral responsibility to being able to fulfill it. Across a variety of contexts and testing procedures, the principal finding has been very consistent: people are definitely willing to attribute moral responsibilities to agents unable to fulfill them. Based on these findings, I and others have concluded that there is no conceptual entailment from “ought” to “can.” But there is a lingering question. If there is no conceptual entailment, then what is the source of the intuitive link, which many theorists seem to sense, between “ought” and “can”? A new paper might provide at least part of the answer.