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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy Comments (15)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Valentine

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Beth Valentine has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Précis by Beth Valentine

“Hypothetical consent is puzzling.” (p.1)  This is how Enoch begins his paper, but by the end I was convinced that this claim is false. “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy” motivates this initial puzzlement by pointing to intuitions regarding hypothetical consent that, at first, appear to lack a cohesive explanation. Through examining actual consent and autonomy, he does much to explain away this puzzlement and argues that hypothetical consent can, in some contexts, make a normative difference.

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By In Featured Philosophers, Metaethics, Value Theory Comments (23)

Expressivism without Minimalism

By Tristram McPherson

It is a striking fact that many of the most recently influential expressivists (e.g. Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Mark Timmons) have embraced minimalist accounts of words such as ‘truth,’ ‘fact,’ and ‘property.’ And others have argued that embracing minimalism is indispensable for the expressivist. In this post, I argue that expressivists can and should resist the idea that they are forced to embrace minimalism.

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By In Featured Philosophers, Metaethics Comments (0)

Coming Featured Philosopher: McPherson on Expressivism without Minimalism

I am happy to announce our next Featured Philosophy post.  On next Thursday, October 5th,  Tristram McPherson (Ohio State University) will be sharing his post “Expressivism without Minimalism”.  Please swing by then to join the discussion!

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By In Ideas, Metaethics, NDPR Discussion Forum, Normative Ethics Comments (11)

The Point of Moral Philosophy: An NDPR Forum with Ingmar Persson

Welcome to another in our regular series providing forums for authors reviewed in NDPR to respond and discuss features of their new books. We are very pleased to welcome Ingmar Persson today, whose new book Inclusive Ethics (OUP 2017) was just reviewed two days ago by David Kaspar for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Ingmar has chosen to do something different this time: Rather than responding directly to the points made in the review, he has written up a guest post about a topic in the book not included in the review, namely, on the point — or lack thereof — of doing moral philosophy. What follows is that post. We encourage our readers to join in on the discussion of what is a very interesting post.

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Metaethics Comments (10)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Paulina Sliwa’s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong,” with a critical précis by Kieran Setiya

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Paulina Sliwa‘s “Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Kieran Setiya has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Action Theory, Ideas, Metaethics, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality, Value Theory Comments (4)

Decisive Reasons and Rational Supererogation

I have a roughly formulated and half-baked inquiry:

Suppose that rationality endorses maximizing utility, but there is room for rational supererogation, and so it is sometimes rationally permissible to drink a coffee even if doing so does not maximize utility.

Would you say that there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, it is still rationally permissible?  Or would you say that, because drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, there is decisive reason against drinking the coffee even though drinking it is rationally permissible?

I am attracted to a usage of decisive reason according to which the consideration that C pinpoints a decisive reason against A’s X-ing if and only if, because C, A should not X.  Given this usage, there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee (from the point of view of rationality) because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, drinking the coffee is still rationally permissible and so it is not true that one should not drink the coffee.  I wonder if folks would balk at this implication and see usages with this implication as thereby counter-intuitive.

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By In Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Uncategorized Comments (6)

Favorite readings on: Subjectivism

Hoping folks will share with the group their favorite papers on the topic of subjectivism. Perhaps people might add what level they think the paper is most appropriate for (grad seminar, undergrad intro, etc.). A short explanation of what the paper says or what makes it great might be useful as well.

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