In our never-ending quest to expand to the limits of the Universe and beyond, Soup will begin having replies to Ethics book reviews.
First up, in about a week, will be Chrisoula Andreou’s review of Justin Snedegar’s Contrastive Reasons (OUP, 2017) which will be available open access here, together with Justin’s replies. Looking forward to the discussion!
Welcome to what we expect will be an interesting and productive discussion on Preston’s Werner‘s “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge” (which the Journal of Moral Philosophy has generously provided free access to until the end of November). David Faraci has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Critical Précis by David Faraci:
Thanks to PEA Soup and to the Journal of Moral Philosophy for offering me this opportunity to discuss Preston Werner’s excellent “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.”
Preston’s paper is, in large part, a response to my “A Hard Look at Moral Perception” (Philosophical Studies 2015), and I want to thank him for taking the time to trudge through that paper. I’ve written a longer reply to Preston, which is also forthcoming in JMP. What I’ll say here is a mix of things I say there and some new stuff.
On October 29, 2017 By David Shoemaker In Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Responsibility, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy, Value Theory Comments Off on Tulane/Murphy Institute Fellowships! 1
The Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University invites applications for three Visiting Research Professorships/Faculty Fellowships for the 2018-2019 academic year.
These fellowships are available to support outstanding faculty whose teaching and research focus on ethics, political philosophy, and political theory, or questions of moral choice in areas such as, but not restricted to, business, government, law, economics, and medicine.
While fellows will participate in conferences and seminars organized by the Murphy Institute, they will be expected to devote most of their time to conducting their own research. Faculty Fellows are normally appointed as Visiting Research Professors, receive a salary of $65,000, and are eligible for Tulane faculty benefits, including health insurance.
The application deadline is December 31, 2017.
Upcoming JMP Discussion, November 10-12: Preston Werner’s “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge”
We’re excited to announce the fifth Journal of Moral Philosophy discussion here at PEA Soup, which will be from Friday, November 10th until Sunday, November 12th. This is sure to be another insightful and productive discussion, this time on Preston Werner’s “Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge”. The Journal of Moral Philosophy has generously provided free access to the article until the end of November, which can be found here. David Faraci will contribute a critical précis and commentary, which will be posted when the discussion starts. Please join the fun! We’re looking forward to hearing your thoughts.
Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy,” with a critical précis by Beth Valentine
Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of David Enoch’s “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Beth Valentine has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Précis by Beth Valentine
“Hypothetical consent is puzzling.” (p.1) This is how Enoch begins his paper, but by the end I was convinced that this claim is false. “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy” motivates this initial puzzlement by pointing to intuitions regarding hypothetical consent that, at first, appear to lack a cohesive explanation. Through examining actual consent and autonomy, he does much to explain away this puzzlement and argues that hypothetical consent can, in some contexts, make a normative difference.
By Tristram McPherson
It is a striking fact that many of the most recently influential expressivists (e.g. Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Mark Timmons) have embraced minimalist accounts of words such as ‘truth,’ ‘fact,’ and ‘property.’ And others have argued that embracing minimalism is indispensable for the expressivist. In this post, I argue that expressivists can and should resist the idea that they are forced to embrace minimalism.