The Canadian Journal of Philosophy hereby calls for papers on the topic “Representation and Evaluation” for a special volume edited by Matt Bedke and Stefan Sciaraffa. The volume provides an occasion to explore the role of representation in theories of meaning and mind with special attention to the implications this has for metaethical, or more broadly metanormative, theory. As such, we welcome fresh assessments of the representational purport (or lack thereof) of normative language and thought (e.g., assertions and thoughts concerning oughts, reasons, values, justification and the like). The due date is June 15, 2017. Submission guidelines are below the fold.
HERE and below is the programme for the second New Methods of Ethics conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham on the 4th and the 5th of January 2017. The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place by emailing me (firstname.lastname@example.org) as there are limited places available. Also, thanks for all of those who attended the first conference few weeks ago. (more…)
I’ve been interested recently in the ways in which norms from some domains impinge on norms from other domains. To that end, I’ve been writing about cruel jokes, wherein the funny and the moral intersect. I don’t at all deny that some cruel jokes are funny; I’ve been known to be amused by many. But there are some cruel jokes that, somehow in virtue of the cruelty, just aren’t jokes. The example I’ve been using is from Stephen King’s book (and/or Brian De Palma’s great film) Carrie. Carrie is raised by a rather terrifying fundamentalist mother, and she is so ignorant about her sexuality that she doesn’t realize what’s happening when she gets her first period in the shower at school. Her classmates tease her relentlessly, and the most cruel among them devise a prank: They make Carrie think she’s the prom queen, and as she’s standing up on stage, soaking in the applause, they dump a bucket of pig’s blood on her. They all find this absolutely hilarious…until Carrie gets a little irritated (for the rest, read the damn book!).
HERE is the programme of the first New Methods of Ethics Conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham in September (15th and 16th). The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place by emailing me (email@example.com) as there are limited places available. If you have any questions about attending the conference, feel free to email me at any point. The programme for the second conference in January will follow shortly.
Suppose that there is both an objective ‘ought’ and a subjective ‘ought’. Which of these two kinds of ‘ought’ figures in the anti-akrasia principle that it is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one ought not to do it?
There is a simple of way of understanding the relation between the objective and the subjective ‘ought’ on which the answer to this question is: Both! It is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one objectively ought not to do it; and it is also irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one subjectively ought not to do it.
(Note: The original version of this post contained a terrible mistake, which was pointed out by Doug Portmore and Jamie Dreier in their comments below. This is an amended version, without the mistake.)
John Brunero and I are running a conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics, here in Lincoln, Nebraska on April 21st to 23rd. Speakers include Michael Bratman (Stanford), Stephen Darwall (Yale), Jonathan Drake (Texas), Amelia Hicks (Kansas State), Chris Howard (Arizona), Sarah McGrath (Princeton), Barry Maguire (UNC), and Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts). There were over 75 submissions for the refereed program and we expect it to be a very good conference.
There will be a free conference dinner Friday night and a party Saturday, so please register if you are coming by sending an email to firstname.lastname@example.org stating that you plan on attending. There’s no fee to attend.
The conference website is https://sites.google.com/site/practicalreasonandmetaethics/. Further information and the schedule is below the fold.
I am pleased to announce a Call for Abstracts for the 2nd annual CHillMeta workshop, taking place in Chapel Hill on September 9-11, 2016. Abstracts (of 3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are welcome from almost anyone—only those who were speakers in the 2014 or 2015 workshop are ineligible to submit something for this year’s event. Submissions are limited to one per person and are due by May 1, 2016. Please email submissions and send any questions to me. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June. More information about the workshop is available here.
On a related note: if you are interested in submitting a paper for the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics (announced earlier here), these are due to me, via email, by March 1. Anyone within 15 years of having received a Ph.D. is eligible to submit a paper for consideration. The winner receives $10,000, an automatic spot on the CHillMeta program, and inclusion of his or her paper in a future volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Hope to see you in Chapel Hill this fall!
All the best,