HERE is the programme of the first New Methods of Ethics Conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham in September (15th and 16th). The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place by emailing me (firstname.lastname@example.org) as there are limited places available. If you have any questions about attending the conference, feel free to email me at any point. The programme for the second conference in January will follow shortly.
Suppose that there is both an objective ‘ought’ and a subjective ‘ought’. Which of these two kinds of ‘ought’ figures in the anti-akrasia principle that it is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one ought not to do it?
There is a simple of way of understanding the relation between the objective and the subjective ‘ought’ on which the answer to this question is: Both! It is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one objectively ought not to do it; and it is also irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one subjectively ought not to do it.
(Note: The original version of this post contained a terrible mistake, which was pointed out by Doug Portmore and Jamie Dreier in their comments below. This is an amended version, without the mistake.)
John Brunero and I are running a conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics, here in Lincoln, Nebraska on April 21st to 23rd. Speakers include Michael Bratman (Stanford), Stephen Darwall (Yale), Jonathan Drake (Texas), Amelia Hicks (Kansas State), Chris Howard (Arizona), Sarah McGrath (Princeton), Barry Maguire (UNC), and Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts). There were over 75 submissions for the refereed program and we expect it to be a very good conference.
There will be a free conference dinner Friday night and a party Saturday, so please register if you are coming by sending an email to email@example.com stating that you plan on attending. There’s no fee to attend.
The conference website is https://sites.google.com/site/practicalreasonandmetaethics/. Further information and the schedule is below the fold.
I am pleased to announce a Call for Abstracts for the 2nd annual CHillMeta workshop, taking place in Chapel Hill on September 9-11, 2016. Abstracts (of 3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are welcome from almost anyone—only those who were speakers in the 2014 or 2015 workshop are ineligible to submit something for this year’s event. Submissions are limited to one per person and are due by May 1, 2016. Please email submissions and send any questions to me. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June. More information about the workshop is available here.
On a related note: if you are interested in submitting a paper for the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics (announced earlier here), these are due to me, via email, by March 1. Anyone within 15 years of having received a Ph.D. is eligible to submit a paper for consideration. The winner receives $10,000, an automatic spot on the CHillMeta program, and inclusion of his or her paper in a future volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Hope to see you in Chapel Hill this fall!
All the best,
The Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln is hosting a conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics to be held April 22-23, 2016. The invited speakers on the conference program are:
- Michael Bratman (Stanford)
- Stephen Darwall (Yale)
- Sarah McGrath (Princeton)
- Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts)
Call for Papers: Four additional papers will be selected though an anonymous review of submissions. For each paper selected, the conference will contribute up to $800 to cover the travel and accommodations of the authors. Submissions are due December 1, 2015. More info below the fold.
Many philosophers seem to think that – even if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are indeed normative notions, as is widely held to be the case – to say that a belief is “justified” is “rational” is to say something stronger than merely that the belief is permissible.
This is a mistake. It is easy to prove that if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are normative at all, then the permissibility of a belief is sufficient for the belief’s being justified or rational.