Moral Responsibility
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By In Call for Abstracts, Call For Papers, Moral Responsibility Comments (0)

CfA: Blame, Punishment, and Health

How should our practices of blame and punishment take into account the mental and physical conditions of those we blame and punish? Philosophers working on moral responsibility have taken up this question squarely, prompting conversations about addiction, immaturity, and the like. But what about the blame and punishment we impose on responsible wrongdoers? How does our health–both physical and mental–affect those practices? For example:  Should we abandon blame if the wrongdoer develops severe dementia? Should punishing young offenders take into account the limited window of reproductive viability? What are we to make of the likely health effects of administrative segregation, constrained exercise, or widespread communicable illnesses? Rutgers University-Camden will host a pre-read workshop on theoretical and applied questions like these in April 2019, with the essays from this workshop to be considered for a peer-reviewed, special issue of Public Affairs Quarterly. The Editor of Public Affairs Quarterly, David Boonin, will attend the workshop and will be available to give feedback on all of the papers.

We welcome abstracts of up to 1,000 words for the pre-read workshop. The abstracts should be prepared for anonymous review and should be in either Microsoft Word or PDF format. We especially welcome submissions from members of underrepresented populations within philosophy.  Send abstracts to RutgersCamdenBioethics@gmail.com.

This workshop is sponsored by funds from the Henry Rutgers Term Chair for Ethics, Health, and Society. Food and lodging will be paid for, and domestic travel expenses will be reimbursed. (International travelers will be reimbursed up to a domestic equivalent.)

Abstracts are due November 3, 2018. Decisions will be made by the beginning of December 2018. Full papers of between 4,000 and 10,000 words will be due February 1, 2019, and the workshop will be held at Rutgers University-Camden on April 5, 2019.

Questions can be directed to Craig Agule (craig.agule@rutgers.edu) or Eric Chwang (eric.chwang@rutgers.edu).

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By In Moral Responsibility, NDPR Discussion Forum, Philosophy of Law Comments (32)

NDPR Forum: Gideon Yaffe’s The Age of Culpability, reviewed by Doug Husak

I’m pleased to introduce a new NDPR Forum, on Gideon Yaffe’s The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2018), which was recently reviewed at NDPR by Doug Husak. As usual, the author of the reviewed book is invited to speak first in response to the review (or to speak about anything else the author is interested in discussing about the book), the reviewer is invited to reply, and there are other discussants who may chime in as well. But our readers are of course also invited to join in on the discussion. Feel free to comment on any aspect of the book, the review, or previous comments.

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By In ETMP Discussions at PEA Soup, Moral Responsibility Comments (3)

Upcoming ETMP Discussion, June 29 – July 1: Robin Zheng’s “What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural Injustice”

We’re thrilled to announce the very first Ethical Theory and Moral Practice discussion here at PEA Soup, which will be from Friday, June 29th until Sunday, July 1st. The discussion will be on Robin Zheng‘s “What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural Injustice”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice has generously provided free access to the article, which can be found here. Maeve McKeown will contribute a critical précis and commentary, which will be posted when the discussion starts.

Please join in on the discussion of the important and captivating intersection between responsibility and injustice. We’re looking forward to hearing your thoughts!

 

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By In Moral Responsibility, Web/Tech Comments Off on Hanna Pickard’s Responsibility Without Blame Project

Hanna Pickard’s Responsibility Without Blame Project

For those who don’t know, Hanna Pickard has developed a very cool site, called “Responsibility Without Blame,” based on her famous article and advocacy. Her clinical and philosophical work has well-placed her to develop this project, which “provides a free and accessible e-learning for anyone interested in thinking about our ideas of responsibility and blame, and finding ways to work and relate more effectively with people with personality disorder or complex needs.”

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By In Action Theory, Character, Ideas, Moral Responsibility Comments (21)

Manipulation Cases and Responsibility: What’s doing the work?

I’ll try to keep this brief, and so will likely run roughshod over important points. I’m curious about what’s doing the work on our intuitions in so-called manipulation cases when people deploy them to theorize about responsibility. These are cases in which someone is one way, values-wise, and then her brain is manipulated by a team of neuroscientists/god to produce within her a new set of values (or subset of values), so that she now performs some action for which she is not responsible — or at least that’s what our intuitions are supposed to be.

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By In Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Responsibility, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy, Value Theory Comments Off on Tulane/Murphy Institute Fellowships!

Tulane/Murphy Institute Fellowships!

The Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University invites applications for three Visiting Research Professorships/Faculty Fellowships for the 2018-2019 academic year.

These fellowships are available to support outstanding faculty whose teaching and research focus on ethics, political philosophy, and political theory, or questions of moral choice in areas such as, but not restricted to, business, government, law, economics, and medicine.

While fellows will participate in conferences and seminars organized by the Murphy Institute, they will be expected to devote most of their time to conducting their own research. Faculty Fellows are normally appointed as Visiting Research Professors, receive a salary of $65,000, and are eligible for Tulane faculty benefits, including health insurance.

The application deadline is December 31, 2017.

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By In Experimental Philosophy, Ideas, Moral Psychology, Moral Responsibility Comments (4)

How “ought” exceeds but implies “can”

Over the past few years, an interesting development in experimental philosophy has been work on the “ought implies can” principle (OIC) in commonsense morality. Several research teams have investigated whether patterns in commonsense moral judgment are consistent with a commitment to OIC, understood as a conceptual entailment from having a moral responsibility to being able to fulfill it. Across a variety of contexts and testing procedures, the principal finding has been very consistent: people are definitely willing to attribute moral responsibilities to agents unable to fulfill them. Based on these findings, I and others have concluded that there is no conceptual entailment from “ought” to “can.” But there is a lingering question. If there is no conceptual entailment, then what is the source of the intuitive link, which many theorists seem to sense, between “ought” and “can”? A new paper might provide at least part of the answer.

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