Practical Rationality
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By In Metaethics, NDPR Discussion Forum, Practical Rationality, Reasons and rationality Comments (14)

NDPR Forum: Ralph Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality

Welcome to our NDPR Forum on Ralph Wedgwood‘s The Value of Rationality (OUP 2018), reviewed by Ali Hasan. Please feel free to comment on any aspect of the book, the review, or the discussion below!

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By In Announcements, News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2018 Program

SLACRR 2018 Program

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality

May 20-22, 2018

All talks are in the Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, MO.
Sunday, May 20
Keynote address: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)
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By In Announcements, Call For Papers, News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2018 and Res Philosophica Prize Issue: CFA

SLACRR 2018 and Res Philosophica Prize Issue: CFA

SLACRR 2018
Call for Abstracts

May 20-22, 2018, Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, MO

Keynote Speaker: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)

SLACRR provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an anonymized abstract of 750-1500 words by January 15, 2018 to SLACRR@gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation. Please attach your abstract as a pdf file, the name of which should be based upon the title of your abstract. (In other words, don’t name your file FILE.pdf or ABSTRACT.pdf)

Papers accepted this year will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Res Philosophica on the topic of reasons and rationality to be published in the first half of 2019. Furthermore, one essay published in the issue will receive a $3,000 prize for best paper. Authors of accepted papers may, but need not, submit their paper to this special issue. Submissions of full papers for the issue will be due August 31, 2018, and will be blind reviewed. Questions regarding the special issue of Res Philosophica can be directed to the editor, Joe Salerno, at editor@resphilosophica.org

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By In News and Events, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality Comments Off on SLACRR 2017 Program

SLACRR 2017 Program

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality 2017

May 21-23, 2017

Keynote: Kieran Setiya (MIT)

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By In Action Theory (Philosophy of Action), Ideas, Metaethics, Practical Rationality, Practical reasons, Reasons and rationality, Value Theory Comments (4)

Decisive Reasons and Rational Supererogation

I have a roughly formulated and half-baked inquiry:

Suppose that rationality endorses maximizing utility, but there is room for rational supererogation, and so it is sometimes rationally permissible to drink a coffee even if doing so does not maximize utility.

Would you say that there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, it is still rationally permissible?  Or would you say that, because drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, there is decisive reason against drinking the coffee even though drinking it is rationally permissible?

I am attracted to a usage of decisive reason according to which the consideration that C pinpoints a decisive reason against A’s X-ing if and only if, because C, A should not X.  Given this usage, there is no decisive reason against drinking the coffee (from the point of view of rationality) because, although drinking the coffee is rationally inferior to another available option, drinking the coffee is still rationally permissible and so it is not true that one should not drink the coffee.  I wonder if folks would balk at this implication and see usages with this implication as thereby counter-intuitive.

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By In Discussions, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup, Moral Psychology, Normative Ethics, Practical Rationality Comments (41)

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Abe Roth‘s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Sarah Stroud has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

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By In Ideas, Practical Rationality Comments (13)

Expected Regrets

Whenever I have had a major life decision to make, it has always struck me as of central – indeed, definitive – importance to think about whether I would regret my decision, if things turned out in one way rather than another.  But I find this a bit puzzling.  I’m going to try out one way of saying why.

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