Call for Abstracts
May 20-22, 2018, Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, MO
Keynote Speaker: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)
SLACRR provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an anonymized abstract of 750-1500 words by January 15, 2018 to SLACRR@gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation. Please attach your abstract as a pdf file, the name of which should be based upon the title of your abstract. (In other words, don’t name your file FILE.pdf or ABSTRACT.pdf)
Papers accepted this year will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Res Philosophica on the topic of reasons and rationality to be published in the first half of 2019. Furthermore, one essay published in the issue will receive a $3,000 prize for best paper. Authors of accepted papers may, but need not, submit their paper to this special issue. Submissions of full papers for the issue will be due August 31, 2018, and will be blind reviewed. Questions regarding the special issue of Res Philosophica can be directed to the editor, Joe Salerno, at firstname.lastname@example.org
St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality 2017
May 21-23, 2017
Keynote: Kieran Setiya (MIT)
Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Abe Roth’s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation,” with a critical précis by Sarah Stroud
Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Abe Roth‘s “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.” The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Sarah Stroud has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!
Whenever I have had a major life decision to make, it has always struck me as of central – indeed, definitive – importance to think about whether I would regret my decision, if things turned out in one way rather than another. But I find this a bit puzzling. I’m going to try out one way of saying why.
Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012) claim that “most of our projects and ends are vague.” (p.99) But I’m not convinced that any plausibly are. On my own blog, I recently discussed the self-torturer case, and how our interest in avoiding pain is not vague but merely graded. I think similar things can be said of other putative “vague” projects.
T&R’s central example of a vague project is writing a book:
Suppose you are writing a book. The success of your project is vague along many dimensions. What counts as a sufficiently good book is vague, what counts as an acceptable length of time to complete it is vague, and so on. (p.99)