Some philosophers opposed to consequentialism think that one of the basic mistakes that consequentialists make is to think that all value is located in states of affairs. (E.g., there are remarks to this effect in T. M. Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other; in R. M. Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods; in Philippa Foot’s "Utilitarianism and the Virtues"; in Bernard Williams’s Utilitarianism: For and Against; and so on.)
Now, I am no friend of consequentialism (au contraire, in fact …), but this attack on the idea that the locus of value is states of affairs seems to me a hopeless manoeuvre for the opponents of consequentialism to make. As I shall argue below the fold, locating all the values that one proposes to talk about in states of affairs is a completely harmless "housekeeping" move which makes no substantive difference to one’s overall ethical theory.
As I intend to argue on another occasion, the crucial issue that really divides consequentialists and their opponents is whether the only appropriate response to values is to promote them, or whether other responses are sometimes more important — such as honouring or respecting values, not harming them, acting in a way that expresses one’s cherishing of them, and so on.