In The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel introduces a distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires that has since become standard in discussions of action theory and moral psychology.   » …Read more

Tennessee Value and Agency “TVA” Conference
2014 Conference – November 6-9, 2014
Practical Reason, Moral Judgment and Moral Sense, Sensibility and Sentiment in the Moral Life

Call For Abstracts

The   » …Read more

Many philosophers (such as J. H. Sobel, R. J. Wallace, G. Harman, M. Bratman, and J. D. Velleman) endorse something along the lines of the following normative requirement regarding intention:

R1: It is impermissible/irrational for S both to intend to X and to believe that she will not X (even if she intends to X).  » …Read more

Warren Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer is supposed to show that cyclic preferences can be rational, and that, in cases where they are, rationality can require resoluteness so that the agent does not end up with an alternative that is worse than the one with which s/he started.   » …Read more